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369 
THE ROAD BEYOND KIOBEL: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN ADHIKARI v. 
KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, INC. AND  
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE  
ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Abstract: On January 3, 2017, in Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”) did not provide jurisdiction for claims brought against a U.S. military 
contractor for torts committed in Iraq. In foreclosing plaintiffs’ claims, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the presumption against the ATS’s extraterritorial application 
barred claims for injuries occurring outside the United States’ territory. In so rul-
ing, the court created a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit, which in Al Shimari 
v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc. held that the ATS provided jurisdiction for 
claims brought against a U.S. government contractor for torts committed in Iraq. 
This Comment argues that the Fifth Circuit adopted a restrictive approach to the 
meaning of the Supreme Court’s “touch and concern” language in Kiobel v. Roy-
al Dutch Petroleum Co. and engaged in a rigid application of the Supreme 
Court’s “focus” test from Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. The Fifth 
Circuit’s holding betrays the purpose of the ATS and is inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court’s ATS jurisprudence. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), enacted by the First Congress in 1789, 
provides federal district courts with original jurisdiction over any civil action 
brought by an alien for a tort committed, both inside and outside the United 
States’ territory, in violation of the law of nations.1 In 2013, the United States 
                                                                                                                           
 1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The actual language of the ATS provides: “[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id. This language has changed slightly since the en-
actment of the statute, although it remains substantively the same: in its original form, the ATS pro-
vided that “[the District Courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several 
States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 
Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The word jurisdiction in this definition was derived from the Latin jus or juris plus 
dicere, which translates in English to “to speak the law.” Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (explaining that because a case arises under the laws of the United States for Article III 
purposes if it is either grounded upon statutes enacted by Congress or upon U.S. common law and 
because the law of nations became a part of U.S. common law when the Constitution was adopted, the 
enactment of the ATS was therefore authorized by Article III of the U.S. Constitution); Anthony J. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. significantly 
limited the scope of the ATS and the potential claims that could be brought 
under it.2 The Court in Kiobel held that the ATS did not apply extraterritorially, 
i.e., the statute did not provide jurisdiction for violations of the law of nations 
committed outside the territory of the United States.3 
The Court in Kiobel, however, went on to enunciate a novel “touch and 
concern” test that courts could use to overcome the ATS’s presumption against 
extraterritorial application.4 In a few sentences at the end of its decision, the 
Court explained that certain claims may “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application.”5 This new standard has prompted much uncertainty 
as to its proper interpretation.6 
After Kiobel, the “touch and concern” standard has been applied by five 
circuits and dozens of district courts.7 These courts have principally disagreed 
on how to approach the “touch and concern” inquiry and what factors to take 
                                                                                                                           
Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction? 99 CORNELL L. REV (Large and small caps). 1303, 
1310 (2014). 
 2 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (concluding that the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of a statute passed by Congress applied to claims 
under the ATS and that nothing in the plain language of the statute barred that presumption). 
 3 Id. The law of nations is the body of law that teaches us about the rights existing between na-
tions or states, and the duties corresponding to those rights. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NA-
TIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NA-
TIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, at iii–v (6th ed. 1844). The various sources of the law of nations are the fol-
lowing: (1) text writers of authority, like famous jurists and code-writers from around the world; (2) 
treaties between nations symbolizing peace, alliance and commerce, and demonstrating changes to 
pre-existing international norms; (3) marine ordinances of nations prescribing rules for maritime war, 
and proclamations and guidance issued to the various branches of the government or to the citizens of 
the state at large; (4) the adjudication of international tribunals; (5) diplomatic correspondence repre-
senting the views of leaders, as well as the written opinions of jurists that serve as advice to their own 
leaders; and, (6) the history of the wars, negotiations, and peace treaties relating to the interactions 
between nations. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 22, 24–25, 29, 31 (5th 
ed. 1916). 
 4 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. The Court did not define the term “touch and concern,” which led 
to much confusion among the lower courts as to what kind of claims could sufficiently “touch and 
concern” the territory of the United States so as to displace the ATS’s presumption against extraterri-
toriality. See id. 
 5 Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–73 (2010)). 
 6 See id. at 125–26. (Alito, J., concurring) (recognizing that the Court’s formulation of the “touch 
and concern” test leaves open many ambiguities); Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 
2013 WL 4564646, at *4 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (noting that the Supreme Court did not provide 
much guidance regarding what is necessary to satisfy Kiobel’s “touch and concern” standard). 
 7 See Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017); Mujica v. AirScan 
Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014); Cardona 
v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., 
Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). See generally Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75 
(D.D.C. 2014); Firtash, 2013 WL 4564646. 
2018] The Road Beyond Kiobel: Impact on the Future of the Alien Tort Statute 371 
into account when determining the “focus” of the ATS.8 This Comment argues 
that the Fifth Circuit in 2017 in Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., was 
too formulaic in its approach to interpreting the Supreme Court’s guidance in 
Kiobel on what claims could overcome the ATS’s presumption against extrater-
ritorial application.9 Part I of this Comment discusses the legislative history of 
the ATS and the Supreme Court’s analysis in Kiobel and in its 2010 decision, 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.10 Part II of this Comment discusses 
the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test and Mor-
rison’s “focus” test.11 Part III of this Comment argues that the Fifth Circuit was 
short-sighted in its approach to determining the true “focus” of plaintiffs’ ATS 
claims, and that this decision has severe implications for not only American 
foreign policy, but also for the future of the ATS.12 
I. THE ROAD TO KIOBEL: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF  
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Section A of this Part presents an overview of the history of the ATS and 
its earlier interpretations by the Supreme Court.13 Section B examines in detail 
a seminal case within the ATS Jurisprudence, Kiobel, which established the 
“touch and concern” test.14 Section C outlines two other recent decisions from 
the Supreme Court, Morrison and the 2016 decision, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eu-
ropean Community, and explains the way in which the Court has evolved its 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly define the term 
“focus” in Morrison, it explained that the “focus” of a statute could be found by determining what 
alleged tortious conduct was the “focus of congressional concern” when the statute was enacted, i.e., 
what conduct did Congress seek to prohibit by the adoption of this statute. Id.; see also Mastafa, 770 
F.3d at 189 (disagreeing with the idea that a defendant’s American citizenship is important for the 
jurisdictional analysis under the ATS because the Supreme Court made clear in Kiobel that only the 
defendant’s conduct was relevant to determining the “focus” of the ATS); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 
520, 530–31 (advocating for a broad, fact-based inquiry that takes into account all pertinent facts 
underlying a plaintiff’s claim, including but not limited to, the defendant’s citizenship or corporate 
presence in the United States; whether Congress intended that the case be heard in the U.S. federal 
courts; important American foreign policy interests implicated by the nature of the defendant’s con-
duct; the nationality of the defendant’s employees; and, the “focus” of the plaintiff’s claims); Mwani 
v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (looking at both defendants’ U.S.-based conduct, as well 
as the intended effect of the conduct in the United States in conducting the “touch and concern” juris-
dictional analysis for an ATS claim against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda stemming from the bomb-
ing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi). 
 9 See infra notes 13–112 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–39 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 40–83 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 84–112 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
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analysis of the “focus” test to determine what circumstances are sufficient to 
displace the ATS’s presumption against extraterritorial application.15 
A. The History of Alien Tort Statute Jurisprudence 
The ATS was passed by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, and provides federal district courts with original jurisdiction over any 
civil action brought by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the law of 
nations.16 The jurisdictional grant of the ATS, at the time of its enactment, was 
limited to providing a cause of action for only three violations of international 
law—piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offenses against ambassadors.17 
Courts have since recognized, however, that the statute provides jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra notes 32–39 and accompanying text. 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 73, 
73–75 (1789); see Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114 (noting that the ATS was passed as part of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719–20 (2004) (explaining that it is 
not likely that the First Congress passed the ATS without meaning for it to have a practical effect; in 
fact, it is likely that the First Congress intended the ATS to provide jurisdiction for a limited number 
of torts in violation of international law); John B. Bellinger III, Legal Advisor to U.S. Sec’y of State, 
Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 
Speech at the 2008 Jonathan I. Charney Lecture in International Law, in 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1, 3 (2009) (explaining that the First Congress, by passing the ATS, likely intended to provide re-
course for crimes committed by American citizens against foreign officials within the territory of the 
United States); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of 
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 465 (1989) (noting that the ATS, by providing access to the federal 
courts, minimized the chance of justice being denied to alien parties when sued in state courts where 
state judges were less likely to be sensitive about national concerns). There are two general theories 
about the ATS’s origins: the citizenship view and the specific tort view. Kedar S. Bhatia, Comment, 
Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 447, 
453 (2013). Under the first view, it is believed that the ATS was designed to give aliens a forum to 
litigate torts committed by citizens of the United States against aliens within the borders of the United 
States. Id. Under the second view, it is believed that the ATS was designed to serve as a cause of ac-
tion for only a small set of specific torts. Id. at 454. The Supreme Court eventually adopted this view 
in Sosa, when it concluded that the ATS only allowed claims for torts that Sir William Blackstone 
identified as the principal violations of the law of nations: piracy, violations of safe conduct, and dis-
putes regarding ambassadors. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; Bhatia, supra, at 454. For the three primary of-
fenses against the law of nations that Blackstone identified, see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *68. 
 17 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (concluding that the jurisdictional grant of the ATS is based on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for a limited number of viola-
tions of the law of nations, and that the First Congress probably had in mind only three such violations 
at the time of the ATS’s enactment—piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offenses against ambassa-
dors); see also Carlee M. Hobbs, Note, The Conflict Between the Alien Tort Statute Litigation and 
Foreign Amnesty Laws, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 508 (2010). But see Thomas H. Lee, The 
Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 836 (2006) (arguing that the 
authors of the Judiciary Act meant to include only matters of safe conduct and not claims related to 
piracy or ambassadors). 
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for additional violations that are both accepted by the modern civilized world 
and are defined with a specificity comparable to the three original violations.18 
The ATS lay dormant for almost two centuries following its enactment.19 
It was revived in 1980 when the Second Circuit breathed new life into it in 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala by holding that torture by a state official was a viola-
tion of international human rights law, and thus, the law of nations.20 The 
standards set by Filartiga eventually became the foundation of the modern-day 
ATS doctrine.21 Filartiga opened up a new field of human rights litigation, and 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (explaining that federal courts should not recognize private claims 
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm unless they are equally defi-
nite and accepted among civilized nations as the historical paradigms prevalent when the original ATS 
was enacted). The Sosa Court implicitly denounced the notion that an international law violation cog-
nizable under the ATS had to be “shockingly egregious” or invoke “universal abhorrence.” See id. 
Instead, the Court left open the possibility that a successful claim under the ATS could be brought for 
international law violations that are well-defined and well-accepted, such as genocide or torture, but 
don’t shock the conscience in the same way. Bhatia, supra note 16, at 471; see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737. 
 19 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (noting that the ATS only allowed for federal jurisdiction in one case 
over a 170-year period); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 587, 588 n.5 (2002) (listing thirteen cases from 1793 to 1980 in which a party unsuccessfully 
attempted to use the ATS as a basis for jurisdiction); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over 
International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 n.15 
(1985) (listing twenty-one published decisions prior to Filartiga, in which a plaintiff invoked the ATS 
as a basis for jurisdiction). The ATS was only upheld as a basis for jurisdiction in two reported cases 
prior to 1980. Bradley, supra, at 588; Randall, supra, at 5. The two cases upholding jurisdiction, Adra 
v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961), and Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 
1795) (No. 1607), were almost one hundred years apart. 
 20 See 630 F.2d at 880; Developments in the Law, Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 
1229 (2011) (noting that the decision in Filartiga transformed the ATS into providing jurisdiction for 
human rights violations committed abroad, but the decision in Sosa limited this jurisdiction to causes 
of action that are “specific, obligatory, and universally accepted” by international law). In Filartiga, 
two citizens of Paraguay, Dr. Joel Filártiga and his daughter, filed a federal court action against 
Américo Noberto Peña-Irala (“Peña”), another Paraguayan citizen, for the wrongful death of Dr. Fi-
lártiga’s son, Joelito. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878–79. The Filártigas alleged that Joelito had been kid-
napped and tortured to death by the Inspector General of Police in Paraguay, in retaliation for Dr. 
Filártiga’s political activities and beliefs. Id. at 878. The Second Circuit determined that the ATS 
provided federal subject matter jurisdiction over Peña. Id. at 887. The court reasoned that the ATS 
provides federal subject matter jurisdiction whenever an alien sues for a tort committed in violation of 
the law of nations. Id.; see Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Filartiga, 630 
F.2d at 887) (noting that Filartiga established that the ATS confers jurisdiction only when three con-
ditions are satisfied: (1) a foreign national sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of 
nations). In arriving at its decision, the court extensively analyzed whether the Filártigas had alleged a 
violation of the law of nations. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–86 (explaining that because the Filarti-
gas had not alleged that the torts — (wrongful death and torture—arose directly under any treaty of 
the United States, the court must first determine as a threshold matter whether the torts violate the law 
of nations). The court stated that the law of nations could be determined by consulting the work of 
jurists, by following the general practice of nations, or by interpreting judicial decisions enforcing 
these laws. Id. at 880. 
 21 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at. at 887. One of the first decisions interpreting the ATS post-Filartiga 
was Kadic. Mohamed Chehab, Finding Uniformity Amidst Chaos: A Common Approach to Kiobel’s 
“Touch and Concern” Standard, 93 U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 119, 123 (2016); see Kadic, 70 F.3d 
at 236. In Kadic, the Second Circuit answered a novel question of whether the law of nations only 
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the ATS quickly became the most often-used litigation route for victims of 
human rights abuses around the world.22 
B. Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Test 
In 2013, in Kiobel, the question before the Supreme Court was whether 
the ATS extends to torts that are committed abroad—in other words, if the ATS 
applies extraterritorially.23 All nine Justices agreed on the narrow holding that 
where there is a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant, and all the relevant con-
duct took place outside the United States, the ATS did not provide relief for 
alleged violations of the law of nations.24 The Court’s decision relied primarily 
on the presumption against extraterritorial application of a federal statute, i.e., 
when the text of a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial appli-
cation, it has none.25 The Court reiterated that this presumption against extra-
territoriality reflects the longstanding principle in American law that unless a 
contrary intent appears, all legislation passed by the United States Congress is 
                                                                                                                           
applied to state actors, or whether it also applied to the conduct of private actors. Kadic, 70 F.3d. at 
236. The Second Circuit concluded that the law of nations did extend to persons acting as private 
individuals, and an example of this would be the prohibition against piracy. Id. at 239; see also 
Chehab, supra, at 123. 
 22 See Chehab, supra note 21, at 123. After Filartiga, several plaintiffs filed over 150 ATS law-
suits, alleging abuses ranging from genocide to summary execution to war crimes. See Roger P. Al-
ford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1751–52 
(2014). The ATS was developed exclusively by several lower courts for almost two decades until 
2004, when the Supreme Court in Sosa finally provided some guidance on the scope of the ATS, 
while leaving the door open for further litigation. Id.; see Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the 
Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1051 
(2015). In the early years following Filartiga, federal courts within the United States assumed juris-
diction on cases involving egregious human rights violations that were still relatively uncontroversial 
because they tended to involve private individuals affiliated with state actors no longer in power. 
Young, supra, at 1051–52. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, the focus of the human rights litiga-
tors changed and plaintiffs then began to use the ATS to bring claims against multinational corpora-
tions committing human rights violations abroad. Id. at 1052. 
 23 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 112–13. In Kiobel, Nigerian nationals residing in the United States sued 
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York under the ATS, alleging that the corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government 
in violently suppressing demonstrators who were protesting the environmental effects of oil explora-
tion. Id. at 113–14; see also Lyle Denniston, Kiobel To Be Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/ [http://perma.
cc/PR4V-T7K5] (discussing the Supreme Court’s order to the lawyers on both sides in Kiobel to come 
back with an expanded argument on the scope of the ATS). 
 24 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined; Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion; Jus-
tice Alito filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Thomas joined; and Justice Breyer filed an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment, but not in the opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan joined. Id. 
 25 Id. at 115 (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255). 
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meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.26 
Following this rationale, the Court in Kiobel held that there was no indication 
that the ATS was passed to make the federal district courts in the United States 
a preferred venue to litigate cases involving violations of the law of nations.27 
The Court, however, went on to explain that regardless of its holding, one 
could imagine a set of circumstances wherein certain claims “touch[ed] and 
concern[ed]” the territory of the United States with “sufficient force” to dis-
place the ATS’s presumption against extraterritorial application.28 Although the 
Court did not provide much guidance on what those circumstances may be or 
even what it meant to “touch and concern” the territory of the United States, it 
did leave open the possibility for the extraterritorial application of the ATS in 
some limited circumstances.29 
After the Kiobel decision, some lower courts dismissed a plaintiff’s 
claims under the ATS if all alleged tortious conduct occurred abroad.30 Other 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. The presumption against extraterritoriality provides that all laws passed by Congress are 
meant to only apply within the territory of the United States, unless Congress explicitly intends oth-
erwise. Note, Clarifying Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Test, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1902, 1905–06 
(2017). This presumption not only ensures that American courts do not apply American law to con-
duct that takes place in foreign countries, but also reinforces the understanding that Congress usually 
only intends its laws to apply within the territory of the United States. Id. at 1906. Furthermore, the 
essence behind such a presumption is that Congress ordinarily only legislates with respect to laws that 
govern domestic issues, and not foreign issues. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115–16 (quoting Morrison, 561 
U.S. at 255). 
 27 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 123. The Court reasoned that such a broad reading of the ATS could lead to 
potential unintended battles between the domestic laws of the United States and those of other nations, 
which could result in international discord and create unwelcomed judicial interference in the United 
States’ foreign relations and policy. Id. at 116–17, 123–24. Additionally, the Court noted that accept-
ing the plaintiffs’ view would also make the inverse true—other nations could potentially be able to 
hale U.S. citizens into their courts for crimes committed elsewhere. Id. at 124–25. 
 28 Id. at 124–25. Although the Court did not provide much guidance on the “touch and concern” 
language, it did opine that mere corporate presence within the United States was not proof enough that 
claims against those corporations “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the territory of the United States with 
“sufficient force” to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 125; see also Doe v. 
Drummond, 782 F.3d 576, 594 (11th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1168 (2016) (explaining that 
Kiobel itself supports the proposition that the corporate status of a defendant might not be dispositive 
to whether a claim “touch[es] and concern[s]” the territory of the United States because the Court, 
after stating the test, announced that if corporate presence was the only thing connecting the claim to 
the territory of the United States, it might not be enough). 
 29 See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. 
 30 See Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 09-CV-1041, 2013 WL 3873960, *5, 8 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 
2013), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument that because Drummond’s CEO made the decision to provide material support to the paramili-
tary group in Colombia at the company’s headquarters in Alabama—and thus within the United 
States—the ATS’s presumption against extraterritorial application had been overcome). The Eleventh 
Circuit subsequently affirmed this decision, stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality will 
be displaced only if the claims are “focus[ed]” in the United States and sufficient relevant conduct 
occurs within the territory of the United States. See Drummond, 782 F.3d at 592; see also Balintulo v. 
Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that the ATS does not permit claims based 
on conduct that took place entirely outside the territory of the United States). 
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courts, however, began to develop a post-Kiobel jurisprudence that considered 
more than just the location of the conduct to decide whether a plaintiff’s cir-
cumstances and claims “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the territory of the United 
States with “sufficient force” to displace the ATS’s presumption against extra-
territorial application.31 
C. Morrison “Focus” Test and RJR Nabisco 
In Kiobel, after enunciating the “touch and concern” test for rebutting the 
ATS’s presumption against extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court cited to its 
2010 decision in Morrison.32 In Morrison, the Court held that when consider-
ing whether a case involves a domestic application of a statute, a court must 
only determine whether the conduct that is the “focus of congressional con-
cern” occurred within the territory of the United States.33 The Court reasoned 
that a statute did not provide relief for alleged tortious conduct occurring with-
in the territory of the United States if it never sought to regulate that conduct. 34 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520–21 (advocating for a broad, fact-based inquiry that takes 
into account all pertinent facts underlying a plaintiff’s claim to determine the “focus” of the plaintiff’s 
claims); Mwani, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (finding that the 1998 bombing outside the United States Em-
bassy in Nairobi “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the United States with “sufficient force” to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS). 
 32 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25; see Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273 (concluding that the ATS’s pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality still applied when there were no securities listed on a domestic 
exchange, and all purchases complained by petitioners took place outside the territory of the United 
States). 
 33 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. The “focus of congressional concern,” is generally understood to 
mean the specific conduct that Congress intended to outlaw with the passage of the statute or the pur-
pose behind the passage of the statute. See id. In Morrison, the Court found that the “focus of congres-
sional concern” behind the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) was on 
the purchases and sale of securities registered on domestic exchanges, i.e., Congress did not intend for 
the statute to apply to transactions on foreign exchanges. Id. In Morrison, the plaintiffs brought suit 
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act based on alleged misrepresentations made in connection with the 
sales and purchases of securities registered on foreign exchanges, even though some of the misrepre-
sentations had taken place within the territory of the United States. Id. at 251–53. After holding that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Court engaged 
in a separate inquiry to determine whether the complaint involved a permissible domestic application 
of the statute when it alleged that some of the misrepresentations were made in the United States. Id. 
at 266. The Court’s separate inquiry considered the statute’s “focus.” Id. The Court ruled that the 
statute “focus” was not on the location where the misrepresentations originated, but on whether the 
sales and purchases of securities were made on domestic exchanges within the territory of the United 
States. Id. It concluded that because the statute was focused on domestic securities transactions and 
the plaintiffs’ alleged domestic activity consisted only of misrepresentations made in connection with 
a foreign transaction, plaintiffs had failed to show a permissible domestic application of the statute. Id. 
at 266–67. 
 34 Id. at 266–67. In Morrison, the Court explained that securities transactions on the domestic 
exchange was the “focus” of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act because Congress intended to regulate only 
those transactions and because it intended to protect only the parties or prospective parties to those 
transactions. Id. Because this case did not involve any securities listed on domestic exchanges, § 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act could not provide any relief to the petitioners. Id. at 273. 
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Kiobel’s citation to Morrison contributed to some confusion in the lower 
courts as to whether it was essential to determine the “focus” of the ATS every 
time a court was faced with a domestic application of the statute.35 In 2016, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco appeared to resolve this conflict 
when it explained that courts must conduct the “focus” analysis along with the 
“touch and concern” analysis when deciding whether the case involved a do-
mestic application of the ATS.36 The Court explained that if the conduct rele-
vant to the ATS’s “focus” took place within the territory of the United States, 
the case was not barred by the ATS’s presumption against extraterritoriality.37 
If the conduct relevant to the “focus” of the ATS occurred outside the territory 
of the United States, however, the ATS could not provide jurisdiction for the 
case to be heard in federal courts in the United States, regardless of any other 
conduct that might have occurred within the territory of the United States.38 
The Court, however, did not provide any guidance on how lower courts could 
determine the “focus” of the ATS, or what facts they could or could not take 
into account when making that determination.39 
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND THE QUESTION OF WHAT IT MEANS TO “TOUCH 
AND CONCERN” THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
Section A of this Part presents the factual and procedural details of the 
Fifth Circuit case, Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.40 Section B exam-
ines in detail how the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari determined that the “touch and 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Drummond, 782 F.3d at 592 holding that Kiobel demands the application of Morri-
son’s “focus” test); Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 183 (same); Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 
(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Kiobel had not advocated for the adoption of Morrison’s “focus test” 
because it deliberately used the words “touch and concern” to enunciate the circumstances that could 
rebut the ATS’s presumption against extraterritoriality); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520–21 (declining to 
adopt the “focus” test because Kiobel held that the plaintiff’s claims, rather than the alleged tortious 
conduct, must “touch and concern” the territory of the United States with adequate force to displace 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, and thus, courts must not pick and choose facts, but rather 
acknowledge all the pertinent facts that give rise to the plaintiff’s ATS claims). 
 36 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). Even though RJR 
Nabisco involved the extraterritorial application of certain Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganization Act provisions, the Court provided guidance regarding the extraterritorial application of 
domestic statutes in general, including the ATS. Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id.; Edward T. Swaine, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: Here, (Not) There, (Not Even) Eve-
rywhere, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 23, 43 (2016) (noting how different courts have taken different approach-
es to quantify the level of relevant conduct in the United States necessary to overcome the ATS’s 
presumption against extraterritoriality). Compare Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 195 (applying a narrow “touch 
and concern” inquiry), with Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530–31 (advocating for a broad, fact-based in-
quiry that takes into account all pertinent facts underlying a Plaintiff’s claim to determine the “focus” 
of the plaintiff’s claims). 
 40 See infra notes 43–56 and accompanying text. 
378 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
concern test” from Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. only allowed domes-
tic conduct to displace the ATS’s presumption against extraterritoriality.41 Sec-
tion C outlines the approach taken by the dissenters in Adhikari and explains 
how this approach is similar to the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Al 
Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.42 
A. A Sad Tale of Human Trafficking and Forced Labor:  
The Case Before the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari 
In 2017, Adhikari was brought to the Fifth Circuit by Buddi Prasad 
Gurung (“Gurung”) and the surviving family members of eleven other men 
(the “Deceased Plaintiffs”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).43 In 2004, Plaintiffs 
were recruited to work at a high-end hotel in Amman, Jordan by a Nepali re-
cruiting company.44 When they arrived in Jordan, they were told however that 
they were instead being sent to work at Al Asad, an American military base 
located just north of Ramadi, Iraq.45 Despite their objections, Daoud and Part-
ners (“Daoud”), a subsidiary of the U.S. military contractor, Kellogg Brown & 
Root, Inc. (“KBR”) put the Plaintiffs in an unprotected fleet of seventeen au-
tomobiles going from Amman, Jordan to Al Asad in Iraq.46 As they were ap-
                                                                                                                           
 41 See infra notes 57–76 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
 43 Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 831, 833 (S.D. Texas 2014). The 
Deceased Plaintiffs were Prakash Adhikari, Ramesh Khadka, Lalan Koiri, Mangal Limbu, Jeet Magar, 
Gyanendra Shrestha, Budham Sudi, Manoj Thakur, Sanjay Thakur, Bishnu Thapa, and Jhok Bahadur 
Thapa. Id. All of the plaintiffs were citizens of Nepal. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 
F.3d 184, 190 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 44 Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 833. The Nepali recruiting company was called Moonlight Con-
sultant Pvt. Ltd. Id. Some of the men were told that they would be working in an American military 
camp, which they assumed was in the United States, and thus, Jordan would just be a brief halt before 
they would be taken to the United States. Id. The men were also told by the recruiting company in 
Nepal that they would not be taken to dangerous locations, and that if they ever found themselves in a 
dangerous situation, they would be sent back home to Nepal at the employer’s expense. Id. 
 45 Id. After the Plaintiffs and Gurung were recruited in Nepal and brought to Amman, Jordan, 
they were handed over to another corporation called Morning Star for Recruitment and Manpower 
Supply (“Morning Star”), which was a Jordanian job brokerage company operating in Amman. Id. 
Morning Star took care of the men when they arrived in Amman, Jordan and started preparing for 
them to travel to Iraq. Id. Morning Star then handed over the Deceased Plaintiffs and Gurung to 
Daoud and Partners, a subcontractor of Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., who forced the men to give up 
their passports, leaving them with no means of escape. Id. at 833–34. Following this, many of the men 
expressed their desire to return home, but they were unable to do anything about it because of the 
amount of debt their families had undertaken to get them these jobs. Id. at 834. 
 46 Id. at 834. Daoud and Partners is a subcontractor of Defendant Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc.; 
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.; KBR, Inc.; KBR Holdings, LLC; Kellogg Brown & Root LLC; 
KBR Technical Services, Inc.; Kellogg Brown & Root International, Inc.; Service Employees Interna-
tional, Inc.; and Overseas Administration Services, Ltd. (collectively, “KBR”). KBR served as a con-
tractor with the United States military to perform specific duties at Al Asad, a United States military 
facility in Iraq. Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. CIV. 09-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *1 (S.D. 
Tex., Aug 23, 2013). 
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proaching Al Asad, two cars containing the Deceased Plaintiffs were stopped 
by members of an Iraqi insurgent group, the Ansar al-Sunna Army.47 These 
men told the drivers of those two cars to leave the Deceased Plaintiffs at the 
checkpoint to Al Asad and assured them that the American soldiers would 
come get them from the military base very soon.48 This turned out to be a lie, 
however, and the Iraqi insurgents shortly thereafter posted a statement on the 
internet announcing to the world that they had captured the Deceased Plain-
tiffs.49 A few days later, international media outlets broadcasted a video of the 
Iraqi insurgents beheading one of the Deceased Plaintiffs and shooting the oth-
er men in the backs of their heads.50 
Unlike the Deceased Plaintiffs, Gurung was fortunate that the Iraqi insur-
gents did not stop the car that he was travelling in.51 Once Gurung arrived at Al 
Asad, he was immediately put to work as a warehouse loader/unloader.52 When 
Gurung heard about the deaths of the Deceased Plaintiffs, however, he ex-
pressed his desire to leave Iraq and go back home to Nepal but both Daoud and 
KBR unequivocally denied his request.53 Gurung was eventually permitted to 
return to Nepal after spending fifteen months at Al Asad, during which he fre-
quently experienced combat-like dangerous situations without protection from 
the U.S. military.54 
In 2008, Gurung and the Deceased Plaintiffs, through their surviving fam-
ily members, filed suit against Daoud and KBR, alleging several claims, in-
cluding one under the ATS.55 The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 834. Ansar al-Sunna is an outgrowth of Ansar al-Islam (Defenders of 
Islam), a group with ties to Iran and which U.S. administration officials have linked to Al-Qaeda. Jaish 
Ansar-al-Sunna, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/para/ansar-al-sunna.htm [http://perma.cc/97X5-PCYK]. 
 48 Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
 49 Id. Many of the family members of the Deceased Plaintiffs saw the images broadcast on Nepali 
television. Id. In the video, the Plaintiffs described their trip to Iraq and explained that they had first 
been “kept as captives in Jordan,” and then forced to go to Iraq. Id. One of the men in the video said, 
“I do not know when I will die, today or tomorrow.” Id. 
 50 Id. Unfortunately, the family members of the Deceased Plaintiffs saw the execution video as it 
was being broadcasted live by international media outlets. Id. Despite these killings, the family mem-
bers were never able to recover the bodies of the Deceased Plaintiffs. Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. KBR is a multinational corporation with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. 
Adhikari, 2013 WL 4511354, at *1. Gurung was informed by both Daoud and KBR that he was not 
allowed to leave Iraq until he was done with his work at Al Asad. Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
 54 Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
 55 Id. at 834–35. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection and Rehabili-
tation Act (“TVPRA”), the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”) and the 
ATS, and also brought common law negligence claims. Id. 
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under the ATS, and Plaintiffs appealed that decision to the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.56 
B. The Fifth Circuit Decides That Kiobel’s “Touch And Concern” Test 
Allows Only Domestic Conduct Sufficient to Violate an International  
Law Norm to Permit an Extraterritorial Application of the ATS 
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by explaining the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and the two-step inquiry that determines its application to a 
federal statute.57 At step one, the court must determine whether the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality has been invalidated by the plain language of the 
statute; and if not, at step two, the court must determine whether the facts of 
the case before it involve a domestic application of the statute.58 
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Kiobel had al-
ready determined at step one that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
barred claims brought under the ATS.59 Thus, it was necessary for the Fifth 
Circuit to proceed to step two of the analysis and determine whether the facts 
alleged by plaintiffs allowed for a domestic application of the ATS. 60 The par-
ties in Adhikari were conflicted over the meaning of Kiobel’s “touch and con-
cern” language and how to square it with Morrison’s “focus” inquiry.61 The 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 191. In November 2009, the district court granted KBR’s motion to dis-
miss the common-law claims, but denied KBR’s motion as to the TVPRA and ATS claims. Id. Fol-
lowing this, KBR filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ATS claims, which the district 
court granted in part and denied in part. Id. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under the 
ATS due to the recently released Supreme Court decision in Kiobel, but chose to deny the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ claims under the TVPRA. Id. KBR then filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s 
decision on the TVPRA claim, which the district court then decided to reconsider. Id. The district 
court then reversed its decision and dismissed the TVPRA claim. Id. This prompted the Plaintiffs to 
file motions for rehearing on the district court’s TVPRA and ATS rulings, but the district court denied 
these motions as well. Id. The Plaintiffs then appealed this decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Id. 
 57 Id. at 192 (explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality is grounded in the under-
standing that a federal law is only meant to apply within the territory of the United States, unless Con-
gress explicitly intends otherwise). 
 58 Id.; see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). If the words 
of the statute do not directly rebut the statute’s presumption against extraterritoriality, then the statute 
does not have an extraterritorial application at step one. Id. If a statute does not pass step one, howev-
er, it does not mean that the statute can never apply extraterritorially as it might still pass step two, 
i.e., the case might warrant a domestic application of the statute. Id. 
 59 Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 193. 
 60 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (explaining that ATS 
claims were barred due to the presumption against extraterritoriality); Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 192. The 
Fifth Circuit adopted the Kiobel Court’s analysis on step one of this inquiry, and proceeded to step 
two noting that the Kiobel Court had not excluded the possibility that the ATS could create jurisdic-
tion for claims that “touch and concern” the United States with “sufficient force” to vacate the ATS’s 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25; Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 192. 
 61 Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 194; see Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 
561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010). Plaintiffs in Adhikari suggested that Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test 
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Fifth Circuit, however, explained that at step two, when determining whether 
the facts of the case involve a domestic application of the ATS, it was essential 
to first determine the “focus” of the ATS, and then evaluate whether that con-
duct that Congress intended to regulate by passing the ATS “touch[ed] and 
concern[ed]” the territory of the United States.62 To determine the “focus” of 
the ATS, the Fifth Circuit only cared about two inquiries: first, whether the 
tortious conduct alleged by Plaintiffs constituted a violation of the law of na-
tions; and, second, whether this tortious conduct occurred within the territory 
of the United States.63 Plaintiffs in Adhikari argued not only that KBR’s al-
leged tortious conduct constituted a violation of the law of nations, but also 
that the conduct occurred both at Al Asad, which as a U.S. military camp was 
arguably under the control of the United States, and directly within the territo-
ry of the United States.64 
Plaintiffs first argued that KBR’s conduct at Al Asad, particularly in rela-
tion to Gurung’s claim that he was subjected to forced labor there, qualified as 
a violation of the law of nations.65 Thus, since Al Asad, by virtue of being an 
                                                                                                                           
superseded Morrison’s “focus” test. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 193; see also Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25; 
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. The Kiobel Court, given the facts before it, had no reason to explore how 
lower courts should evaluate claims involving domestic conduct that would prompt a domestic appli-
cation of the ATS, and thus, it had not provided any guidance to the lower courts on how to evaluate 
the “touch and concern” language. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25; Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 194. The 
Fifth Circuit in Adhikari, however, reasoned that RJR Nabisco had made it clear that both Kiobel and 
Morrison were viable precedents to determining the domestic application of the ATS. Adhikari, 845 
F.3d at 194; see RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 62 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266–67 (explaining that the “focus” of a statute is generally understood 
to mean the specific conduct that Congress intended to outlaw with the passage of the statute or the 
purpose behind the passage of the statute); Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 194; see Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. 
See generally Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d 576, 592 (11th Cir. 2015) (taking the middle road in con-
sidering both Kiobel’s standards and Morrison’s “focus” test to determine whether the claim and the 
relevant conduct were both sufficiently centered in the United States to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and allow jurisdiction); Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 
2014) (holding that the Kiobel Court did not intend to incorporate Morrison’s “focus” test, which 
aligns with the position advocated by the Plaintiffs in Adhikari). 
 63 Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 195. The Fifth Circuit distinguished between conduct underlying the 
claims alleged by the Plaintiffs and conduct that was relevant to the statute’s “focus.” Id. at 194. The 
court explained that whether the ATS applies domestically is determined by the location of the con-
duct relevant to the statute’s focus. Id. at 197. The court found that the ATS’s focus is the tort or the 
wrong committed in violation of the law of nations. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1350. (2012). If that tort or 
wrong was committed in a foreign country, however, the case involved an impermissible extraterrito-
rial application of the statute, regardless of any other related conduct that might have taken place with-
in the territory of the United States. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 197. 
 64 Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 197. Plaintiffs alleged that KBR violated the law of nations by conspiring 
to traffic laborers from Nepal and subjecting them to harsh conditions at Al Asad. Id. Given that these 
allegations occurred in Nepal, Jordan, and Iraq, the Fifth Circuit quickly dismissed them, as none of 
that conduct could support a domestic application of the ATS. Id. 
 65 See id. at 195. Plaintiffs claimed that KBR’s conduct at Al Asad was particularly relevant to 
Gurung’s claim that he was subject to forced labor on the military base and often put in dangerous 
situations with no protection. Id. Plaintiffs also contended that KBR’s conduct at Al Asad was rele-
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active U.S. military base, was under the jurisdiction of the United States, 
KBR’s illegal conduct on the base should be actionable under the ATS.66 Not-
withstanding Gurung’s claim of forced labor, KBR argued instead that this was 
a matter of de jure sovereignty, i.e., Al Asad was not a U.S. territory because it 
was physically located in Iraq, a sovereign nation, and thus, was under the con-
trol of Iraq; therefore, even if the tortious conduct alleged by plaintiffs violated 
the law of nations, it could still not give rise to an actionable claim under the 
ATS since the conduct took place in Iraq.67 The Fifth Circuit agreed with KBR 
and held that Plaintiffs had not met their burden to prove that the United States 
exercised control over Al Asad to such a degree and in such a manner that it 
could be characterized as a territory of the United States.68 Thus, KBR’s al-
leged illegal conduct against plaintiffs at Al Asad occurred within the jurisdic-
tion of Iraq and not the United States, and that conduct could not qualify as 
domestic conduct relevant for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ ATS claims.69 
Plaintiffs next argument was that KBR wired money to Daoud using 
banks based in New York City, and that the employees of KBR based in Hou-
ston, Texas, were aware of the allegations of human trafficking at Al Asad, but 
were deliberately indifferent to them, and in some cases, even sought to cover 
them up.70 This conduct certainly took place within the territory of the United 
States, but according to the Plaintiffs, also constituted as a violation of the law 
of nations.71 The Fifth Circuit, however, held that this conduct—providing fi-
nancial support and being aware but indifferent to the allegations of human 
rights violations taking place at Al Asad—did not violate the law of nations, 
                                                                                                                           
vant to the fact that the Deceased Plaintiffs had been subjected to international human trafficking. Id. 
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the district court below had found that there was a genuine dis-
pute of material fact as to whether KBR knew that it was contracting with trafficked laborers during 
that time. Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 195–96. KBR’s argument, if found to have merit, would defeat Plaintiffs’ characteriza-
tion of Al Asad as a U.S. territory, thus rendering the alleged conduct of KBR at Al Asad non-
domestic for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ ATS claims. See id. The Plaintiffs, in response, however, cited 
the Supreme Court’s decision in 2004 in Rasul v. Bush, which suggested that a functional inquiry may 
be applicable in these situations. 542 U.S. 466, 470–75 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas statute 
applied to persons detained at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay because the United 
States exercised complete jurisdiction and control over it); Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 195–96. The Fifth 
Circuit found, however, that the Supreme Court intended to limit its holding in Rasul to the habeas 
context. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 196; see Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470–75. 
 68 Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 197. The Fifth Circuit explained that for a military base to qualify as a 
U.S. territory, it was essential for the United States to intend to exercise control over that military base 
on a permanent basis. Id. In this case, the United States’ use of Al Asad as a military base began in 
2003 at the start of the Iraq War, and ended eight years later in 2011. Id. Given that the United States 
military did not have any intentions to stay at Al Asad permanently, the Fifth Circuit found that the 
military base did not qualify as a territory of the United States. Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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and therefore, it did not matter that this conduct took place within the territory 
of the United States.72 The Fifth Circuit reiterated that only a tort or a wrong 
committed in violation of the law of nations could be considered when deter-
mining the “focus” of the ATS.73 Here, because the torts committed in viola-
tion of the laws of nations —human trafficking and forced labor—occurred in 
a foreign country, the court was not allowed to consider any other conduct that 
may arguably have taken place within the territory of the United States.74 In 
sum, the Fifth Circuit found that none of the alleged tortious conduct on the 
part of either KBR or Daoud at Al Asad or within the territory of the United 
States was sufficient to displace the ATS’s presumption against extraterritorial-
ity.75 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dis-
miss all of Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS.76 
C. The Dissenting Justices in Adhikari Argue for an Approach Similar to 
the Fourth Circuit’s Approach in Al-Shimari 
In 2014, in Al Shimari, the Fourth Circuit held that the claim brought 
against a Virginia-based military contractor by former detainees of the Abu 
Ghraib detention center in Iraq for abuse and torture “touch[ed] and con-
cern[ed]” the territory of the United States with “sufficient force” to receive 
jurisdiction under the ATS.77 The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court 
in Kiobel had explained that the plaintiffs’ claims must “touch and concern” 
the territory of the United States with adequate force to displace the ATS’s pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality and not necessarily the alleged tortious 
conduct.78 This meant that the court was required to consider more than just 
the tortious conduct that violated the law of nations and the location of that 
conduct.79 Applying this fact-based inquiry that took into account all the perti-
nent allegations made by the plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit rejected the idea that 
just because the alleged torture occurred in Iraq and not in the United States, 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. The Fifth Circuit explained that the “focus” of the ATS was on conduct that violates inter-
national law, and if that conduct took place in a foreign territory, then the ATS did not apply even 
though there might have been other related conduct that occurred within the territory of the United 
States. Id. 
 74 Id. at 197–98. The Fifth Circuit also found that Plaintiffs had failed to show that there existed a 
clear link between KBR’s alleged financial transactions with Daoud and the Plaintiffs’ alleged inter-
national law violations. Id. at 198. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ contention that KBR’s Texas-based employ-
ees may have known about the allegations against Daoud or KBR overseas was not enough to find 
that those employees were directly complicit in violating the law of nations. Id. 
 75 See id. at 195–98. 
 76 See id. at 195–98, 207. 
 77 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 78 Id. at 527; see Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. 
 79 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527; see Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. 
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the plaintiffs’ claim should be subjected to the same outcome as the plaintiffs’ 
claims in Kiobel.80 
This same approach of using a fact-based inquiry to determine whether 
Plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the territory of the 
United States was also advocated by the dissenting opinion in Adhikari.81 Cir-
cuit Judge James E. Graves, Jr. wrote a dissent to the majority’s opinion, which 
he believed had effectively rendered Kiobel’s “touch and concern” standard 
meaningless.82 Although he conceded that the “focus” inquiry did rest on the 
alleged tortious conduct that violated international law, he advocated that the 
inquiry should involve consideration of all pertinent facts underlying the Plain-
tiffs’ ATS claims, and not just the alleged tortious conduct and the location of 
that conduct.83 
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF KIOBEL’S “TOUCH AND 
CONCERN” STANDARD AND MORRISON’S “FOCUS” STANDARD IS 
UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTIVE AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE  
SUPREME COURT’S ATS JURISPRUDENCE 
Section A of this Part argues that the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari v. Kellogg 
Brown & Root, Inc. conducted a very limited inquiry into the “focus” of the 
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) by only examining the location of KBR’s alleged 
tortious conduct, and not doing a broad fact-based inquiry into all the relevant 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528. The Fourth Circuit applied a fact-based analysis and noted that 
plaintiffs’ allegations of torture were committed by American citizens, employed by an American 
corporation (CACI), whose corporate headquarters were in Fairfax County, Virginia. Id. The court 
also noted that the alleged tortious conduct in Iraq occurred at a U.S. military facility operated by 
United States government personnel; the employees who allegedly participated in the acts were hired 
by CACI in the United States to fulfill the terms of a contract between the United States Department 
of the Interior and CACI; and that the contract had been issued by a government office in Arizona. Id. 
at 528–29. Weighing these factors, the Al Shimari court unanimously held that the plaintiffs’ claims 
“touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the territory of the United States with “sufficient force” to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. Id. at 530. 
 81 See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 207–210 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 82 Id. at 208. 
 83 Id. at 209. Judge Graves was critical of the fact that the majority in Adhikari paid no heed to 
the identity and citizenship of the defendant, KBR, a U.S. corporation. Id. at 209–10. He also noted 
that the majority was incorrect in dismissing the fact that KBR was financially supporting Daoud 
using American banks, and that the employees of KBR located in Houston, Texas were aware of KBR 
and Daoud’s questionable operations in Iraq, and had yet chosen to do nothing about it at all. Id. at 
211–14. Finally, Judge Graves argued that the ATS was passed by the First Congress in response to 
the concerns it had about foreign relations. Id. at 210. Given that the statute’s purpose was to provide 
a forum for plaintiffs to litigate human rights abuses occurring abroad, Judge Graves believed that the 
majority’s decision implicated both domestic and foreign interests of the United States, especially 
given that the alleged tortious conduct here took place on a U.S. military camp in Iraq. Id. at 211. He 
explained that although these policy considerations might not be dispositive to the extraterritorial 
application of the ATS in this case, it was still important for the Fifth Circuit to take them into account 
when determining the “focus” of the ATS. Id. 
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facts that gave rise to the Plaintiffs’ claims.84 Section B argues that the Fifth 
Circuit’s application of the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. “touch and 
concern” test and the Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. “focus” analy-
sis in Adhikari undermines American foreign policy.85 
A. The Fifth Circuit in Adhikari Conducted a Very Limited Inquiry into the 
“Focus” of the ATS by Only Examining the Defendant’s Alleged  
Tortious Conduct in the United States 
The basic disagreement regarding Kiobel’s “touch and concern” standard 
revolves around which facts should be taken into account when determining 
whether the ATS’s presumption against extraterritoriality has been displaced.86 
The position advocated by the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari looks only to conduct 
that is in violation of international law and the location of that conduct.87 In 
contrast, the approach advanced by the Fourth Circuit in Al Shimari v. CACI 
Premier Technology, Inc. calls for a broad, fact-based inquiry that takes into 
account all pertinent facts underlying a plaintiff’s claim, including but not lim-
ited to, the defendant’s citizenship or presence in the United States, whether 
Congress intended that the action be heard in the United States’ courts, im-
portant American foreign policy interests triggered by the nature of a defend-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See infra notes 86–99 and accompanying text. 
 85 See infra notes 100–112 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Swaine, supra note 39, at 43 (noting how different courts have taken different approaches 
to quantify the level of relevant conduct in the United States necessary to overcome the ATS’s pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality). Compare Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 
195 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying a narrow “touch and concern” inquiry), with Al Shimari v. CACI Prem-
ier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014) (advocating for a broad, fact-based inquiry that 
considers all pertinent facts underlying a plaintiff’s claim to determine the “focus” of the plaintiff’s 
claims). 
 87 Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 195. In this scenario, if a court finds that all relevant conduct related to 
the plaintiffs’ ATS claim occurred within the United States, there would be no issue about the ATS’s 
extraterritorial application; however, if a court finds that none of the relevant conduct occurred within 
the United States, it is likely that the plaintiffs’ claims will be barred entirely under the ATS. See 
Swaine, supra note 39, at 42 (noting that the extremes of what level of conduct is relevant to displace 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is easy to address). Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion 
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., said that the conduct occurring within the territory of the 
United States must on its own be sufficient to establish a claim under the ATS, thereby making any 
conduct that took place outside the United States essentially irrelevant to the inquiry. See 569 U.S. 
108, 126 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito’s approach, however, would not only completely 
disregard any tortious activity happening in a foreign nation regardless of whether the claims 
“touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the territory of the United States, but also subvert piracy claims on the 
high seas—one of the original international law violations considered by the First Congress when 
enacting the ATS—that technically do not fall within the physical territory of the United States. See 
Swaine, supra note 39, at 43 (explaining that even if all piracy claims were allowed to proceed under 
the ATS, it would be out of line to suggest that any analogous crimes would be entirely excluded from 
the scope of the statute). 
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ant’s conduct, the nationality of the defendant’s employees, and the “focus” of 
the plaintiff’s claims.88 
The Fifth Circuit in Adhikari should have adopted and applied the ap-
proach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Al Shimari and taken note of the fact that 
KBR is a U.S. corporation, domiciled within the territory of the United States, 
when determining whether Plaintiffs’ claims “touche[ed] and concern[ed]” the 
U.S. territory.89 Furthermore, it should have taken into account the evidence 
put forth by Plaintiffs of U.S.-based conduct by KBR that illustrated its partic-
ipation in this transnational trafficking scheme.90 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit 
should have considered the evidence that KBR was wiring money to Daoud 
from the United States through banks located in New York.91 This kind of fi-
nancial support was made possible due to the subcontract signed between KBR 
and Daoud, which was done in the presence of KBR’s employees based in 
Houston, Texas.92 The Fifth Circuit was short-sighted to find that none of this 
evidence showed a direct link between KBR’s U.S. operations and the alleged 
international law violations taking place at the hands of KBR’s subcontractor, 
Daoud, based in Al Asad.93 After all, it is not too much of a stretch to infer that 
providing financial support to a group engaged in human rights violations, 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 529–31 (4th Cir. 2014). With respect to 
the “focus” approach, the Eleventh Circuit has seemingly taken the view that the extraterritorial pre-
sumption will not be overcome if the relevant conduct alleged is not sufficiently “focused within the 
United States.” Baloco v. Drummond, 767 F.3d 1229, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2014). This approach, how-
ever, misconstrues the Kiobel decision. Id. Although the location of the relevant conduct may be one 
consideration with respect to the “touch and concern” inquiry, it alone is not dispositive. See Al 
Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530–31. Some other lower courts have also cited facts about the parties—such as 
the U.S. nationality of the defendant, or its domicile or residency in the United States—to determine 
whether the claims “touch and concern” the United States or, alternatively, bear on the “focus” of the 
ATS. See, e.g., Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that a defendant’s citi-
zenship and corporate relationship with the United States could be one factor that might “touch and 
concern” the territory of the United States with adequate force to displace the ATS’s presumption 
against extraterritoriality); Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d 576, 596 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the 
citizenship or corporate status of the defendant is relevant to the “touch and concern” inquiry set forth 
in Kiobel); Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-1357(RCL), 2015 WL 5042118, at *7 (D.D.C. July 6, 
2015) (holding that corporate citizenship alone was not enough for ATS jurisdiction). But see Warfaa 
v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 660–61 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that nothing in this case involved Americans, the 
American government or any events concerning the United States, but also suggesting that just be-
cause the defendant happens to be located in the United States does not mean that it should be a factor 
to be considered for the purpose of ATS); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 188 (2d Cir. 
2014) (disagreeing with the contention that a defendant’s U.S. citizenship has any relevance to the 
jurisdictional analysis). 
 89 See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 209 (Graves, J., dissenting) (pointing out the majority’s failure to 
consider the U.S. corporate status of KBR); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528. 
 90 See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 211–12 (Graves, J., dissenting) (pointing out the majority’s failure to 
acknowledge and give credit to Plaintiffs’ evidence that KBR’s U.S.-based conduct implicated it un-
der the ATS). 
 91 Id. at 212. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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both human trafficking and forced labor, in the Middle East makes one com-
plicit in the successful operation of that scheme.94 
The Fifth Circuit also refused to consider the evidence put forth by Plain-
tiffs that implicated the U.S.-based employees who allegedly knew about the 
actions of Daoud and KBR at Al Asad, but chose to turn a blind eye towards 
it.95 The district court in Adhikari did note in a footnote that Plaintiffs’ most 
harmful evidence was the fact that one of KBR’s U.S.-based employees termi-
nated a consultant based at Al Asad after he complained about Daoud’s actions 
on the military base against laborers such as Gurung.96 This was in fact not the 
only complaint of abuses at Al Asad that reached KBR’s U.S.-based employ-
ees, and thus, it is very dubious to think that these employees were not aware 
of what was going on at Al Asad.97 By affirming the district court’s decision to 
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS, the Fifth Circuit failed to consider 
that a reasonable jury could have possibly found that KBR’s U.S.-based em-
ployees knew about these human rights abuses taking place at Al Asad, but 
either willfully ignored them or, in some cases, actively sought to cover up on 
behalf of the key perpetrator, Daoud.98 Consequently, the decision by the Fifth 
Circuit not to consider any of this additional evidence in determining whether 
Plaintiffs’ claims “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the U.S. territory was premature 
and against the weight of ATS jurisprudence thus far.99 
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Application of Kiobel’s “Touch And Concern” 
Standard and Morrison’s “Focus” Standard in Adhikari  
Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy 
The most pressing concern about the Fifth Circuit’s near-sightedness in 
Adhikari is the foreign policy ramifications of a decision that declines to hold 
accountable perpetrators of crimes in violation of international law.100 These 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1021 n. 4 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d sub 
nom. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 16-
1461, 2017 WL 2463601 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017). Plaintiffs’ most incriminating piece of evidence against 
KBR was a decision by a U.S.-based employee of KBR to remove a consultant from Al Asad after he 
complained of the violations being committed by Daoud at Al Asad against the laborers recruited to 
work on the military camp. Adhikari, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 1021 n. 4. It must be noted, however, that this 
evidence was undercut by the fact that the same U.S.-based employee, after removing the consultant 
from Al Asad, requested that initiation of an investigation into the complaints. Id. 
 97 See Adhikari, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 1021 n. 4. The district court also noted that KBR in Houston 
had received other complaints from a U.S. Marine stationed at Al Asad regarding the treatment of 
workers on-site. Id.; see Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 213 (Graves, J., dissenting). 
 98 See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 213 (Graves, J., dissenting). 
 99 See id. at 210–13. 
 100 See id. at 207–210 (discussing how the majority was incorrect to summarily dismiss the for-
eign policy implications of its decision). 
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foreign policy concerns are particularly troubling when KBR’s conduct points 
a clear finger at the United States military.101 KBR was one of the largest mili-
tary contractors operating in Iraq, and the Fifth Circuit’s failure to provide the 
Plaintiffs with a forum to bring forth their claims of human trafficking and 
forced labor overseas undermines American policy against such practices.102 
Military contractors are critical for the success of the U.S. military, and 
because their work is so intertwined with that of the military itself, they are 
often perceived as an extension of the military.103 Given the evolving nature of 
warfare and the political motivation within the United States to outsource all 
nonessential military functions to private contractors, military subcontractors 
have been used in greater numbers in recent years.104 In the case of Plaintiffs in 
Adhikari, the men were recruited from Nepal under the false pretense that they 
would be employed in hotels in Amman, Jordan, but in reality, their brokers 
always knew that these men were eventually contracted to work, against their 
will, in the U.S. military bases in Iraq.105 Given the close relationship between 
KBR, Daoud, and the U.S. military, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Adhikari is 
highly damaging to U.S. military interests and to the safety of military opera-
tions across the world.106 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See id. at 211. 
 102 See id.; see also United Nations, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Trans-
national Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319. Just a few years before the incident in 
Adhikari, the United States signed and ratified a treaty that asked all signatories to hold their citizens 
responsible for human trafficking. United Nations, United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, Vol. 2346, No. A-39574 (2008), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
Volume%202346/v2346.pdf [http://perma.cc/L8NQ-9B65] (explaining the obligations of the United 
States as signatory to the treaty); OFFICE TO MONITOR & COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 19 (2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/66086.pdf [http://perma.cc/2X8H-6Q4P] (summarizing the Department of Defense’s 
investigation and response to labor trafficking in Iraq). 
 103 Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 211. 
 104 Amy Kathryn Brown, Baghdad Bound: Forced Labor of Third-Country Nationals in Iraq, 60 
RUTGERS L. REV. 737, 746 (noting that although the Vietnam War only involved the participation of 
about 9,000 civilians, the recent Balkan Wars of the 1990s involved close to 12,000 contractor em-
ployees, which surprisingly outnumbered the number of military personnel on the ground). The Unit-
ed States’ invasion of Iraq provided for several lucrative opportunities for military subcontractors. Id. 
at 748 (illustrating Halliburton as an example and explaining that despite reports of mismanagement, 
Halliburton received more than $4 billion in contract work from the Department of Defense in 2003). 
In fact, as of 2006, Halliburton’s then-subsidiary KBR had outsourced most of its $12 billion contract 
with the U.S. military in Iraq to many subcontractors that were based in countries that were already 
struggling to contain human rights abuses, including human trafficking, within their own borders. Id.; 
Cam Simpson, Iraq War Contractors Ordered to End Abuses, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 2006, at 3 (ex-
plaining that KBR had outsourced most of the U.S. military work in Iraq to sub-contractors in the 
Middle East, and that about 70% of the people employed were non-American citizens hired from 
outside Iraq). 
 105 See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 190–93 (reciting facts of the case). 
 106 See id. at 210–13 (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority fails to understand the im-
plications of not holding U.S. military contractors liable for human rights abuses abroad). 
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The majority in Adhikari summarily dismissed any and all concerns about 
the foreign policy ramifications of their decision.107 Their reasoning, however, 
not only completely frustrates the purpose for which the ATS was enacted, it also 
makes the statute somewhat superfluous given the current international political 
climate.108 At the time that the ATS was passed, the First Congress only imag-
ined three violations of international law that, in their opinion, would ever re-
quire redress under the ATS—piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offenses 
against ambassadors.109 Although courts today have expanded this list to include 
contemporary violations of international law, the decision in Adhikari appears to 
not understand the sophisticated nature of transnational crime today.110 Most 
modern-day violations of international law, like we saw in Adhikari and Al 
Shimari, are perpetrated through a coordinated and concerted effort made by 
several players across the world, including those who recruit, those who finance, 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See id. at 198 (majority opinion) (explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies regardless of any risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law). 
 108 See id. (explaining that contractors provide crucial support to the U.S. military at many active 
war zones, so much so that they are often considered to just be an extension of the U.S. military it-
self); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Na-
tions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 515 (2011) (explaining that by passing the ATS, the First Congress 
ensured that aliens would have at least one forum to litigate their claims for violation of international 
law). 
 109 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 73, 73–75; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (explaining that the jurisdictional grant of the ATS was initially 
limited to only three violations of international law—piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offenses 
against ambassadors). It is true that the ATS was initially adopted by the First Congress to make sure 
that the United States upheld its commitment to the law of nations. Bellia & Clark, supra note 108, at 
515. At the time that the ATS was passed, sovereign nations were required to provide redress to plain-
tiffs that had been subjected to tortious conduct in at least three circumstances: first, when the viola-
tion occurred on domestic soil; second, when a citizen of that nation was responsible for perpetrating 
the violation; and third, when the wrongdoer sought to escape liability within the territory of the na-
tion. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Sub-
ject to [the reasonableness requirement of] § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect 
to (1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of 
persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is 
intended to have substantial effect within its territory; (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of 
its nationals outside as well as within its territory . . . .”). It was understood that a failure to provide 
recourse in any of the above-mentioned circumstances implicated the nation as an accomplice in the 
violation. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 108, at 475 (explaining that a nation was responsible for 
providing redress from injuries caused by its citizens against foreigners). 
 110 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. The original 
language of the ATS provided that “[the District Courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with 
the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien 
sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. This kind of reasoning is incorrect because the First Congress, by 
choosing to adopt the language, “all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law 
of nations,” intended to have the ATS encompass all kinds of intentional harm inflicted on an alien 
that would be in violation of international law. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 108, at 543 (explaining 
that this broader reading of the ATS more correctly represents what the First Congress intended re-
garding the applicability of the ATS). 
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and those who turn a blind eye toward the abuse.111 Consequently, the Fifth Ciir-
cuit’s approach in Adhikari puts severe limits on the future of the ATS, especially 
if courts continue to advocate for the understanding that the ATS was never 
meant to apply to a modern subset of torts committed by a modern and sophisti-
cated set of perpetrators in violation of the law of nations.112 
CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit’s approach in Adhikari to Kiobel’s “touch and concern” 
test was incorrect in its limited inquiry into the “focus” of the ATS. In this 
case, the Plaintiffs’ allegations implicated the United States and its military. 
Despite that, the Fifth Circuit engaged in a formulaic application of the Su-
preme Court’s ATS jurisprudence thus far, without acknowledging the policy 
implications of such a decision on American foreign relations and the United 
States’ standing in the world. The court should not have overlooked that the 
defendant, KBR, was an American corporation domiciled within the United 
States. Nor should it have ignored the fact that KBR and Daoud were receiving 
funds through wire transfers from New York-based banks, and that KBR’s em-
ployees in Houston, Texas were aware of the human rights abuses taking place 
under KBR’s watch at Al Asad. The Fifth Circuit’s decision is contrary to the 
expectations of the First Congress and jeopardizes the future of the ATS. 
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 111 See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 190–93 (reciting facts of the case); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520. 
 112 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 108, at 552 (noting that the ATS was passed to provide redress to 
aliens injured at the hands of Americans, and thus, satisfy America’s obligations under international law). 
